Military | Europe
Iran Was Trying to Build a Nuclear Bomb Before the War — Here Is the Specific Evidence
Trump said Iran had restarted its nuclear program and was developing missiles that could strike the US. Here is what the intelligence evidence actually showed and what the IAEA knew.
Trump said Iran had restarted its nuclear program and was developing missiles that could strike the US. Here is what the intelligence evidence actually showed and what the IAEA knew.
- Trump said Iran had restarted its nuclear program and was developing missiles that could strike the US.
- Trump's State of the Union address on February 24, 2026 — four days before the strikes began — included the specific claim that 'Iran had restarted its nuclear program and was developing missiles capable of striking the...
- For the IAEA's specific monitoring data: the International Atomic Energy Agency's reports through early 2026 documented that Iran was enriching uranium to 60 percent purity — below the 90 percent weapons-grade level but...
Trump said Iran had restarted its nuclear program and was developing missiles that could strike the US.
Trump's State of the Union address on February 24, 2026 — four days before the strikes began — included the specific claim that 'Iran had restarted its nuclear program and was developing missiles capable of striking the United States.' Understanding this claim requires separating what US intelligence assessed, what the IAEA independently monitored, and what the specific timeline of Iranian enrichment activity actually showed.
For the IAEA's specific monitoring data: the International Atomic Energy Agency's reports through early 2026 documented that Iran was enriching uranium to 60 percent purity — below the 90 percent weapons-grade level but significantly above the 3.67 percent ceiling that the JCPOA had established. Iran's stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium was estimated at approximately 372 kilograms — a quantity that, if enriched further to 90 percent, would be sufficient for multiple nuclear devices.
For the 'weapons capability' timeline: the specific intelligence question is the difference between uranium enrichment capability (which Iran demonstrably had) and weaponisation (the specific engineering of a deliverable nuclear weapon). The pre-war intelligence consensus among Western agencies was that Iran was 3-6 months from weapons capability if it made the specific decision to enrich to 90 percent and conduct the specific weaponisation work whose status was the subject of intelligence debate.
For the long-range missile capability: Iran's Shahab-3 and subsequent ballistic missile programmes have produced specific missiles with ranges sufficient to reach Europe. The specific claim about 'missiles capable of striking the US' addresses intercontinental ballistic missile capability — which Iran did not possess at the time of the State of the Union address by any publicly available intelligence assessment.
For the diplomatic context: the February 6 indirect negotiations in Oman's Muscat were described by the mediating Omani foreign minister as having produced 'significant progress, with Iran willing to make concessions.' Trump said he was 'not thrilled' with the talks. The war began 22 days later.